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The Expansion of College Education in the United States:
Is There Evidence of Declining Cohort Quality?
This paper documents the expansion of college education in the U.S. and examines to
what extent the increase in the number of college graduates may have lead to a decline in the
average quality of college graduates.  Using the 1940-1990 Census, we compare across birth year
cohorts with varying levels of college completion.  We find some weak evidence that college
graduate men from highly educated cohorts earn a relatively smaller wage premium even
controlling for the relative supply effect.  However, these cohort quality effects account for only a

















In 1940, approximately 5 percent of men aged 20-64 were college graduates.  By 1990,
the fraction with a college degree had more than quadrupled to 22.6 percent.  Conversely, more
than 70 percent of men aged 20-64 had not finished high school in 1940.  By 1990, the fraction
of the male population who were high school dropouts had dipped below 20 percent.  These
changes imply that there has been an enormous increase in the supply of skilled workers in the
U.S. economy over the past five decades.  The magnitude of these changes also suggests that the
composition of these groups, in terms of their underlying ability and talents, have also changed,
making it difficult to compare these groups over time. 
In this paper we focus on the expansion of college education.  We ask whether the
increase in the number of college graduates over time lead to a decline in the average ability of
college graduates.  Following Becker (1967), we introduce a simple model of human capital
accumulation with individuals who differ in ability and borrowing costs.  Under the assumption
that the ability distribution is fixed and the more able attend college, we examine the conditions
under which a rising share of college graduates leads to a decline in the average ability of the
college educated group.
The relationship between the expansion of higher education and the average ability of
college attendees was explored by Taubman and Wales (1972) in their well-known study. 
Putting together evidence from a variety of test score studies, they reported that the average
aptitude of those who attended college actually rose relative to those who did not attend college. 
We take an alternative, more aggregate approach in examining the expansion of college4
education and average ability in this paper.  Using the 1940-1990 Census, we compare across
cohorts with different levels of educational attainment.  We ask whether college graduates from
more educated cohorts receive a smaller college premium and locate in less skilled occupations,
even controlling for the relative supply effect. Thus, we do not observe changes in ability
directly, but infer changes in ability through changes in relative wages and occupational
distribution.
There are several reasons why we view this alternative approach as useful.  First, the test
score studies are based on different tests administered in different states which raises questions
about the comparability of the results over time.  Second, the test scores are often available only
for those who finished high school.  Since the selection of high school graduates is also
changing, it is difficult to infer changes in ability of college graduates. Third, test scores typically
have little explanatory power in earnings regressions, suggesting other dimensions of ability are
important for earnings determination.  Finally, many of these studies refer to the first half of the
twentieth century while we extend the analysis to the more recent period. 
A number of recent papers (Murphy and Welch (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Topel
(1997),  Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998)) have argued that the rapid increase in the share college
graduates depressed college premiums in the 1970s.  Welch (1979), Berger (1985) and Card and
Lemieux (2000) show that these declines in college premiums were particularly associated with
the baby-boom cohorts who entered college in record numbers.  In this paper we examine to what
extent these “cohort” effects may reflect a decline in quality associated with an accelerated pace
of college attendance. 
To preview our results, we find a small and marginally significant cohort quality effect5
which suggests that a 10 percent increase in the cohort-specific college share leads to a 0.6
percent decline in the college premium, holding everything else constant.  These results suggest
that changes in cohort quality played a minimal role in the recent period, with relative supply and
demand shocks accounting for most (87 percent) of the variation in relative wages. These small
relative wage effects related to changes in ability are in line with evidence from test scores
reported in Murnane, Willett and Levy (1995).
1  
Section II begins by describing the aggregate changes in educational attainment over the
period 1940-1990.  While we concentrate mostly on prime-age men in this paper, we also report
changes in educational attainment of women.  Section III presents our human capital framework. 
Section IV presents the results from our cohort-level regressions.  Section V presents a summary
of our main findings. 
II. THE EXPANSION OF COLLEGE EDUCATION IN THE U.S.
One of the most notable changes in the U.S. labor market in the past several decades has
been the increase in educational attainment of its labor force.  In this section we document this
change using the 1/100 sample of the 1940-1990 Public Use Micro Samples (PUMS).  To
describe changes in the education distribution over time we use an inclusive sample of men and
women who were 20-64 years old.  Our regressions results are based on men who are older, 25-
64 years old.  We restrict our analysis to the older group since they are more likely to have
completed their education and we examine men in order to ensure consistent labor market
attachment.  To calculate labor quantities, we include men 25-64 years old who were employed6
during the survey week but did not work in agriculture.   To calculate wages, we chose a more
select sample of these men who were wage and salary workers, worked full-time, worked at least
40 weeks, and earned at least ½ the legal federal minimum weekly wage.  Our wage measure is
the weekly wage calculated as annual earnings divided by weeks worked.  Annual earnings were
deflated using the PCE deflator from the national product and income accounts.  
Table 1 reports shares of men and women of prime working age (20-64 years old) in four
education categories: less than high school, high school graduate, some college, and college
graduate.  In 1940, as much as 74 percent of working-age men had less than a high school degree
while 5.4 percent had a college degree.  By 1990, less than 20 percent were high school dropouts
while 22.6 percent college graduates.
2  The bottom panel of table 1 reports the educational
attainment of women.  The table shows that there has been an equally dramatic increase in the
educational attainment for women although women are still slightly less likely to be college
graduates than the men.  For example, even in 1990, the fraction of women who are college
graduates is 18.6 percent compared to 22.6 percent for men.  However, as will be illustrated in
figure 3, the educational attainment of the most recent cohorts presents a different picture in that
women are now more likely to be college graduates than their male counterparts.
[Table 1 here]
Figure 1 and figure 2 present educational attainment by birth-year cohort for men and
women respectively.  The different panels present shares of the four education groups:  less than
high school, high school graduate, some college, and college graduate.  The figures are based on
data from the 1940-1990 Census.  As is apparent from the figures, men and women in any
particular birth-year cohort acquire more schooling as they age.  For example, a greater fraction7
of the cohort born in 1920 are college graduates in the 1950 Census (when the cohort is 30 years
old) as compared to the 1940 Census (when the cohort was only 20 years old).  To extrapolate
the shares in each education category for the most recent cohorts, we run the following simple
regression using cohort-level data:
(1)  ect = "Act + (c + :at + ,ct
where ect is the share of the cohort in the education category, Act is a quartic in age, (c is the
cohort specific effect measured by birth-year cohort dummies, :at are year-"young" interaction
dummies where "young" is defined as 20-24 years old and ,ct is the error term.   We run these
regressions for each of the four education groups and graph the shares predicted at age 35. 
[Figure 1 and Figure 2 here]
Figures 1 and 2 show that the fraction who had less than a high school degree fell
dramatically from over 80 percent among the 1880 birth cohort to approximately 10 percent
among the most recent cohorts.  On the other hand, the fraction who are college graduates
increased from less than 5 percent to over 30 percent among the most recent cohorts.  For men,
college graduation rates peaked with the 1948-1950 birth cohorts (among whom approximately
31 percent were college graduates) and declined among the more recent cohorts.  It is interesting
that for women, college graduation rates began to accelerate starting with later cohorts and there
is little evidence of a decline among the more recent cohorts. 
The trend in college enrollment in the most recent period is better illustrated in figure 3
which is based on March CPS data.
3  The figure reports the fraction of 20-24 year old men and8
women who are either college graduates or still enrolled in school during the survey years 1968-
1995.  The left panel of figure 3 shows that college enrollment peaked for men in the late 1960s
with the cohorts born in the late 1940s, fell to approximately 24 percent in 1981 and has
increased again in the most recent period most probably in response to the rise in the college
premium.  College enrollment among women (illustrated in the right panel of figure 3) has more
or less increased continuously throughout the 1970s and the 1980s and has surpassed the
enrollment rates observed among men in the most recent period. 
[Figure 3 here]
These figures illustrate the substantial variation in college completion rates across birth
cohorts, particularly among men.  The differences between men and women also suggest that
factors such as the GI Bill during the 1940s and the deferment of the draft during the Vietnam
War may have played important roles.  It is these types of differences in college enrollments
across birth cohorts that will be the basis of our empirical work in section IV.
  
III.  MODEL OF HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND COHORT QUALITY
To provide a framework for discussion and for our empirical work, we examine a
simplified version of the Becker (1967) model of human capital accumulation.  This model has
been reformulated by Rosen (1977) and generalized to incorporate heterogeneous human capital
in Willis and Rosen (1979).  Most recently it has been revived to discuss biases in estimating
returns to schooling from cross-sectional data (Card (1994) and Lang (1994)).  Our purpose here
is to characterize, within the context of this well-known model, the conditions under which we9
(2)
can expect the size and average ability of the college educated group to negatively co-vary.  The
share of college educated can increase for a variety of reasons such as an increase in price of
skills acquired in college, decline in tuition costs, and decline in the cost of borrowing funds
which may be affected by government loan or subsidy programs.  In our discussion below we
consider these different cases.
4
Individuals maximize the present value of life time earnings and compare the benefits and
costs in deciding whether to obtain a college degree.  The discounted benefit of college education
net of foregone earnings, R(2, r, 8), depends on the price of the skill acquired in college, 2, the
interest (discount) rate, r, and the ability of the individual, 8.  R(2, r, 8) is increasing in 2,
decreasing in r, and increasing in 8 (R2 > 0, Rr < 0, and R8 > 0).   We denote the direct costs of
college (such as tuition) as $, and assume that it is positive and independent of ability.
5
A worker of ability 8 will decide to enter college if the benefit exceeds the cost, 
R(2, r, 8) > $.  At each interest rate, r, one can define a cut-off ability level 8* such that 
R(2, r, 8*) = $.  8* is a function of 2, r, and $.  Further, M8*/M2 = - R2 /R8 <0, 
M8*/M$ = 1/R8 >0, and M8*/Mr = - Rr /R8 >0.  In other words, the cut-off ability declines as the
price of college skills increases, and rises with increases in tuition costs and the interest rate. 
Denoting the joint population density of interest rate and ability as h(r, 8), the size of the college
going population (N) and their average ability (Ec(8)) are obtained as in equation (2).10
In the above, the interest rate is assumed to take a value between 0 and a finite upper-bound r G
<4.
Case 1: Everybody faces the same interest rate at r*.
 
When everybody faces the same interest rate, the joint density can be denoted as the
marginal density, h(8), and the number of college entrants and their average ability may be
calculated by integrating only over ability, 8.   Under this assumption,  now consider an increase
in the college skill premium, d2>0. The change in the skill premium induces a change in the cut-
off ability level, 8*, and it can be shown that MN/M2 = - h(8*) @ M8*/M2> 0.  That is, college
enrollment increases.  At the same time, MEc(8)/M2= (Ec(8)-8*)h(8*)/N@ M8*/M2<0, and the
average  ability of college entrants declines. An increase in returns to schooling induces relatively
low-ability workers to enter college.  In this simple case, we will see a negative relationship
between the number of college graduates and their average ability.  An increase in tuition costs
that does not vary with ability, d$>0, would be the mirror image of the case described above. 
College enrollment will decline and average ability will rise.  These simple cases are illustrated
in figure 4.
[Figure 4 here]
Case 2 : Individuals face different interest rates due to borrowing constraints.
In the presence of imperfect capital markets, individuals can also differ in terms of their11
(3)
access to funds.  It may be the case, for example, that individuals from wealthier families have
lower cost of borrowing than individuals from poorer families.  In this case, the cut-off ability
8*(2, $, r) rises with r and it is possible that very high ability individuals will choose not to
attend college when faced with very high borrowing costs.  If a given increase in the returns to
college skills, 2, or reduction in tuition costs, $, leads to greater adjustments among individuals
facing higher borrowing costs, it is at least theoretically possible that these marginal entrants will
actually raise the average ability of the college educated group.  In the following we characterize
the conditions under which such cases can be ruled out.
The impact of a change in the skill price on the number of college entrants and their
ability are obtained by differentiating (2) with respect to 2 as in the following:
The first partial derivative in equation (3), MN/M2, has an unambiguously positive sign as 8* is a
decreasing function of 2.  An increase in the college skill premium increases the number of
college entrants.   
If the second partial derivative in equation (3) is negative, this would lead to negative co-
variation between the size and average ability of the college educated group.  Since M8*/M2<0,
the second partial derivative in equation (3) is negative when Ec(8)-8* is positive at all levels of
r.  In other words, the cut-off  ability level is below the average ability of college educated group12
at all levels of r.  Ec(8)-8* is likely to be positive at all levels of r if the cut-off ability does not
vary much across interest rates, i.e. M8*/Mr is positive but small.  Since  M8*/Mr =- Rr/R8, this
condition is satisfied when the comparative advantage in returns to higher ability individuals, R8, 
is large relative to the disincentive effect of the higher interest rate.  In other words, ability plays
a larger role in determining who acquires education and large differences in r generate only small
differences in 8*.  This, in effect, gets us close to case 1 and an increase in 2 will most likely
lead to a decline in average ability.
Another component is the adjustment M8*/M2 at high and low interest rates.  If # M8*/M2#
decreases with r so that adjustments at high interest rates are smaller than those at lower interest
rates, this reduces the likelihood of an increase in average ability. 
Finally, the shape of the joint density, h(r,8), matters.  The negative relation between size
and average ability of the college group is more likely if the joint density, h(r,8) has little mass at
high interest rates and high ability. This effectively reduces the importance of the adjustment at
high ability-high interest rate margins.  We have assumed so far in our discussion that the
distribution of ability and borrowing costs are uncorrelated in the population.  Recent papers by
Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Cameron and Taber (2000) suggest that this correlation may
be negative.  To the extent that family income affects ability directly rather than through
borrowing costs, this would strengthen the negative relationship between size and average ability. 
We have so far examined how college enrollment and average ability changes in response
to an increase in returns to college, d2>0, or its mirror image, reduction in tuition costs, d$<0.  It
is also interesting to consider whether size and ability would negatively co-vary when borrowing
costs, r, change due to government loans and subsidies.  We examine this case in the appendix13
and focus on two different types of subsidies, a general subsidy that lowers the cost of funds for
everyone, and a narrower subsidy that targets those individuals who would otherwise face very
high interest rates.  Our conclusions are intuitive and not very surprising.  A general subsidy that
lowers r for everyone would lead to an increase in college enrollments and an unambiguous
decline in average ability.  It is possible that a targeted subsidy that only affects those who
initially face very high interest rates may lead to an increase in average ability.  This is due to the
fact that these individuals at the margin are high ability individuals, and inducing them to enroll
in college may actually increase the average ability of the college population.
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IV. THE EFFECT OF COHORT-SPECIFIC COLLEGE SHARE
 ON THE RELATIVE WAGE OF COLLEGE GRADUATES
In this section, we examine the relationship between rising college share and average
ability of the college educated group using cohort-level data from the 1940-1990 Census.  Our
analysis covers a long span of time using comparable data which is an advantage. A disadvantage
is that we do not have direct measures of ability and therefore must infer changes in ability
through changes in wages.  More specifically, we examine whether college graduate men from
highly educated cohorts earn a smaller college premium, holding constant other variables which
also affect the college premium. 
In what follows, we first aggregated the data by census year, single year of age, and by
college completion.  We ran regressions in changes using weighted least squares on this
aggregate level data.. Our dependent variable is the decade change in log relative wage of college
graduates at different ages.  In other words, we compare the college premium received by, for14
(4)
example, 40 year-old college graduate men in year t with the college premium received by 40
year-old college graduate men 10 years earlier, thereby utilizing between-cohort variation in the
data.  Our main regressor of interest is the between cohort log differences in the share who went
to college, )log(Nac/Na).  We use predicted college share of each cohort at age 35 as specified in
equation (1) rather than actual observed shares at time t, so as to not confound the effects of
cohort quality and relative supply.  The variation in the data that we exploit is illustrated in figure
5 which graphs decade log changes in relative wage and college share at different age levels over
the period 1979-1989.  The picture illustrates the strong negative correlation between changes in
relative wage and college share during this latter period.  Although they are less pronounced,
negative correlations also exist in other periods as illustrated in figure 6.
[Figure 5 and Figure 6 here]
To the extent that workers in different education groups are imperfect substitutes for each
other, the increase in college share will negatively impact the relative wage of college graduates
regardless of the quality effect.  We control for relative supply in three alternative ways.  In the
first specification, we include year dummies to control for aggregate supply and demand shocks
and run the following regression 
where a indexes age and c indexes college graduate.  This assumes that workers in different age
groups are perfect substitutes for each other so that an influx of new college graduates will have
an equally adverse impact on all college graduates and the year dummies control for this effect.  15
(5)
As indicated in equation (4), we also include a control for overall cohort size, )log(Nact/Nct),  and
dummies for young (25-35) and middle age (35-50).  
In the second specification, we control for changes in the relative supply of workers with
different education levels, high school dropouts )log(Ndt/Nt), high school graduates,
)log(Nht/Nt), and college graduates, )log(Nct/Nt). The relative supply of college graduates is the
actual share observed in year t,  rather than the predicted share at age 35 which is our main cohort
quality variable.  However, the two variables are highly co-linear, making it difficult to
separately identify the two effects.  We follow the strategy suggested in Welch (1979) where we
define relative supply as the weighted average around a given age group.  The supply of college
graduates, for example, is defined as N
* act = 1/9*(Na-2,ct+2*Na-1,ct+3*Nact+2*Na+1,ct+Na+2,ct).  This
assumes that workers in nearby age groups are closer substitutes.  More specifically, we run the
following regression for this specification 
 
Finally, we include a relative supply variable based on years of potential experience rather
than age.  In other words, in this specification, we assume that college graduates compete with
high school graduates who are typically about four years younger and enter the labor market in
the same calendar year.   We run the following regression in the last specification 16
(6)
where Nxt refers to the number of workers at a given year of potential experience.
  [Table 2 here]
The regression results are reported in table 2.  Column (1), which corresponds to our first
specification,  shows that the coefficient on the cohort college share variable is negative and
statistically significant when only year dummies are included to control for relative supply. 
However, the relationship between cohort college share and the relative wage of college
graduates becomes much weaker in our alternative specifications shown in columns (2) and (3). 
When we use the relative supply measure defined around age (column 2),  the cohort college
share variable is marginally significant (at the 10% significance level).  The coefficient -.063
implies that the average premium is about 0.6 percent lower for a cohort that is 10 percent larger
than average. When we use our alternative relative supply measure which is based on experience
(column 3), the size of the coefficient on cohort college share variable is similar (-.060) although
it is no longer significant.   
A large literature on the effects of cohort size on earnings suggests that the wage penalty
associated with being in a large cohort is especially pronounced upon labor market entry as
suggested by Welch (1979) and Berger (1985).  In the following section we examine whether our
cohort quality effect also varies by age.  We ran regressions as specified in (5) separately for
young workers (between the ages 25 and 34) and for older workers (35 and older).  The
coefficients are reported in table 3.  When we examine young workers only, our sample is17
reduced to 50 observations, and we find that the cohort quality variable is no longer significant. 
In the specification where we control for relative supply (column (2) of table 3), the cohort
quality variable actually turns positive and is marginally significant.  The cohort quality variable
is much more robust and stable when we look at older workers (columns (3) and (4) of table 3). 
Aside from the fact that we have more observations for the older group, our assumption that
workers at different ages are equally good substitutes for each other may be more valid for older
workers, thus allowing us to more cleanly separate the quality and quantity effects.
[Table 3 here]
What is the economic significance of a coefficient such as (-.063)?  What does this imply
about the possible role of declining cohort quality in the 1970s and the 1980s?  To answer this
question, we use the coefficients from our cohort-level regressions (column (2)) to decompose
total decade log changes in the relative wage of college graduates  into components due to cohort
quality, relative supply, and year effects.  Overall, the relative wage of college graduates declined
5.3 percent during the 1970s and increased 9.3 percent during the 1980s.  Of the 5.3 percent
decline over the 1970s, relative supply changes contributed a decline of 6.6 percent while an
additional 2 percent decline was predicted by changes in the share of college.  Aggregate time
effects contributed an increase of 3.3 percent over this period.  During the 1980s, the impact of
cohort quality was smaller.  Aggregate time effects contributed an increase of 13.6 percent in the
relative wage of college graduates.  Relative supply changes contributed a decline of 3.3 percent
and changes in college share contributed a decline of 1 percent.  We conclude from table 2 that
the cohort college share variable (our measure of cohort quality) is only weakly related to relative
wages of college graduates once we control for relative supply.   Overall, relative supply and time18
effects which may reflect aggregate demand changes in favor of college graduates account for
most of the variation (87%) in college wages.
7 
It may be useful to compare our results based on aggregate data to micro-level evidence
from test score results.  Recently, Murnane, Willett, and Levy (1995) reported test results from
two successive cohorts using the National Longitudinal Survey 1972 and the High School and
Beyond.   They report average IRT-scaled math scores for college graduates and for the entire
sample who finished high school.  They find that between those two cohorts the college vs.
overall test score differential increased 1.39 points, implying an increase in the average ability of
college graduates between these two cohorts.  Since the share of the cohort who attended college
fell during this period, this is consistent with a negative relationship between size and average
ability.  According to their estimates, a 1 point increase in the math score results in a .013
increase in log hourly wages six years after the test.  This results in a small predicted increase in
the relative wage of college graduates between these two cohorts, generally in line with the small
quality effects we find in our paper.  
Finally, we end with the question that we first began with.  What do we think of the
enormous increase in the share of college graduates over time?  Despite the fact that the cohort
quality effect we estimate is small, nevertheless this would imply a large impact of declining
cohort quality on college wage premium over 1940-1990 as the share of college graduates
increased from 5 percent in 1940 to 23 percent in 1990.  We believe that this exercise would
overstate the importance of cohort quality effects since the key assumption is that the distribution
of ability is fixed over time.  If we adopt a more broad definition of ability, as accumulated
knowledge of potential college entrants, it seems very reasonable that ability would respond to19
changes in the demand for college graduates over the long run.  Thus, our theoretical and
empirical work presented in this paper may be more appropriate for examining short run changes
where the distribution of ability can be described as fixed.
 
V. Summary
Using Census data, this paper documents the enormous increase in educational attainment
of men and women in the U.S. during the 1940-1990 period.  The paper examines whether the
increase in number of college graduates lead to a decline in the average quality of college
graduates and consequently affected their relative wages.  The paper finds some weak evidence
that college graduates from more educated cohorts receive a smaller college premium, holding
constant other factors that also affect relative wages.
8  These quality effects, however, appear to
be small relative to the effects of demand and supply shocks and appear to have played only a
minor in the recent fluctuations in the college premium. 
Appendix I
In this section, we consider changes in the distribution of borrowing costs, r.  For
simplicity of presentation, we assume that the distributions of r and 8 are orthogonal.  Under that
assumption, the joint density h(r, 8) can be written as a product of marginal densities, g(r|*)f(8). 
Here * is the shift parameter specific to the density of interest rate, g(.).  A change in * induces
changes in the number of college entrants and their average ability as the following.20
(A-1)
In the above expression, N(r) is the number of college entrants facing the interest rate r, and
decreases with r.  The impact on the number of college entrants depends on the correlation
between N(r) and Mg/M*.  Relaxation of borrowing constraints will tend to make Mg/M* positive at
low r and negative at high r, and thus the number of college entrants will increase given such
change in the distribution of r.
The impact on average ability depends on the correlation between I8* (8-Ec(8))f(8)d8
and Mg/M*.  As Ec(8) is the weight average of I8* 8f(8)d8 where the weights are g(r|*), the
integral must have a negative value at low r and a positive value at high r.  As a result, the
integral must increase with r initially.  But at high r, it may start to decline as 8* may exceed
Ec(8).  Consequently, I8* (8-Ec(8))f(8)d8 has an inverted-U shape and the impact on average
ability may vary with the extent of relaxation in borrowing constraints.
A general relaxation in borrowing constraints may be parameterized as positive values of
Mg/M* at low r and negative values of Mg/M* at high r.  This is described in the left panel of the
diagram below.  In this case,I8* (8-Ec(8))f(8)d8@ Mg/M* tends to have a negative value, and as a
result, the average ability tends to decline. 21
When the relaxation is of a very limited scope, the average ability may increase.  This
case is described in the right panel of the diagram.  Suppose the borrowing constraints are
relaxed only for those with extremely high interest rates.  Then Mg/M* will be negative at such
high interest rates and it will be positive at slightly lower interest rates.  If this change in the
density g(r|*) occurs where I8* (8-Ec(8))f(8)d8 decreases, a higher value of I8* (8-Ec(8)) f(8)d8
is multiplied with positive Mg/M* and a lower value of I8* (8-Ec(8)) f(8)d8 is multiplied with
negative Mg/M*.  Consequently, the average ability may increase.  
The intuition behind these results is quite simple.   The change in average ability depends
on those newly entering college.   In the first case, the change in density is assumed to induce
more college enrollment among those who have faced relatively low interest rates.   At the
margin those individuals at low interest rates are less able individuals and their entry decreases
average ability.   In the second case, the change in density induces actions only at high interest
rates.22
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1 Our quality effects are smaller than those reported by Rosenbaum (1999) who examines the rise
in the college premium with and without ability controls.  While both papers use cohort-specific
educational attainments to proxy for ability changes, the difference in our results may be due to
the fact that we focus exclusively on changes in ability composition in this paper while he also
allows for changes in returns to ability over time.    
2 The 1990 Census questionnaire changed emphasis from grades attended to degree obtained.  In
order to make the 1990 data comparable to the earlier years, we imputed the distribution of
grades completed by reported education on the 1990 Census using the matched March samples
for 1991-92.  Details of this imputation procedure are available from the authors. 
3 Reporting of education on the March CPS switched between the 1991 and the 1992 surveys. 
We again used the March matched samples from 1991-92 to calculate the distribution of grades
completed and school enrollment status by the new reported education variable.  
4 Although our theoretical model considers declines in cohort quality arising from changing
ability compositions, the decline in quality may also arise from sudden increases in enrollment26
reducing the quality of college education when resources are relatively fixed in the short run. 
Our empirical work can also address these types of changes in cohort quality. 
5 Of course, an alternative set-up would be to assume that the return, R, does not vary with ability
but the cost of going to college is negatively related to ability. 
6 Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Cameron and Taber (2000) conclude that credit constraints
are less important than permanent income and family background characteristics in explaining
schooling attainment.   Both papers find that borrowing constraints are not empirically important,
at least for the recent cohorts.  These papers suggest that short-term tuition subsidies are unlikely
to encourage enrollment of high ability students from lower income families. 
7 Recently, a number of papers have examined whether the recent increase in the college
premium was due to rising returns to raw ability rather than skills acquired in college (see, for
example, Blackburn and Neumark (1993), Chay and Lee (1997), Cawley, Heckman and Vytlacil
(1998)).  While this is an important question in its own right, our focus in this paper is on wage
effects due to changes in ability composition rather than changing returns.  In our empirical work,
both increases in returns to ability and college skills are captured by the aggregate time effects
reported above. 
8 In earlier versions, we also examined the occupation distribution of college graduates from
different birth cohorts.  We found some evidence, particularly in the more recent data, that
college graduates from more educated cohorts were less likely to be working in the most skilled
occupations, where occupations are ranked based on the average wage in the occupation.  These
results are available upon request from the authors. 27
TABLE 1
Education Distribution for Men 1940-1990
Years of Schooling 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
< 12 73.6 63.3 54.5 39.7 25.4 18.6
=12 15.3 21.2 25.1 32.1 35.1 35.7
13-15  5.8  8.3 10.2 13.9 19.3 23.1
16+  5.4  7.3 10.2 14.3 20.2 22.6
Education Distribution for Women 1940-1990
Years of Schooling 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
< 12 70.0 59.0 51.1 38.3 25.4 17.7
=12 19.7 27.4 32.8 39.7 42.2 39.7
13-15  6.5  8.4 10.0 13.2 18.7 24.1
16+  3.8  5.2  6.1  8.8 13.6 18.6
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Source: 1940-1990 PUMS (1% samples). The samples include men and women aged
20-64.28
TABLE 2
Effects of Cohort-Specific College Share
on Wages of College Graduate Men
Dependent Variable =    )log(Wact/Wat)
   (1)   (2)   (3)
Cohort College   -.101*  -.063+ -.060
  Share   (.027)  (.038) (.039)
Relative Supply
 
  < 12 Years     --   .056+   .026
 (.030)         (.030)
                                                           
  12-15 Years     --  -.027   .031
 (.040)       (.037)
                                                           
  16+ Years     --  -.075+  -.037
 (.040)         (.032)
Cohort Size   -.042*  -.000  -.025
  (.019)  (.025)  (.022)
     
Year Dummies Included yes   yes    yes
Age-group Dummies Included yes   yes    yes
Relative supply (age) no   yes    no
Relative supply (experience)  no   no      yes 
Number of Obs. 200   200    200
----------------------------------------------------------------
Source: 1940-1990 Census PUMS (1% sample).The sample includes 25-64 year old
men who were working during the survey week.
Note: Wage Regressions also include control for cohort size, 5 year dummy
variables and 2 age dummy variables for young and middle age workers.
Cohort College Share = )log(Nac/Na).Cohort Size = )log(Nact/Nct).Relative Supply
in column (2) is defined as N*
aet={1/9*(Na-2,et+2*Na-1,et+3*Naet+2*Na+1,et+Na+2,et)}/Nat
where e refers to the education group- high school dropouts, high school
graduates, or college graduates. Relative Supply in column (3)is Nxet/Nxt where
x refers to years of potential experience rather than age.29
TABLE 3
Effects of Cohort-Specific College Share
on Wages of College Graduate Men
Dependent Variable =    )log(Wact/Wat)
Workers Aged<35 Workers>=35
  (1)   (2)   (3) (4)
Cohort College  -.039   .188+ -.068+ -.075
  Share  (.057)  (.098) (.036) (.048)
Relative Supply
 
  < 12 Years    --   .222   -- .014
 (.161)        (.056)
                                                           
  12-15 Years    --   .542   -- -.068 
(.040)
                                                           
  16+ Years    --  -.243   -- -.043
 (.271) (.048)
Cohort Size    .025   .094 -.052+ -.037
  (.054)  (.069) (.029) (.035)
Year Dummies     yes   yes   yes yes
Age Dummies     no    no    no  no
Relative supply (age)   no   yes    no  yes
Number of Obs.     50    50   150 150
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Source: 1940-1990 Census PUMS (1% sample).   The sample includes
25-64 year old men who were working during the survey week.
Note: See table30
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